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Many incentive contracts are based on subjective evaluations and contractual disputes 
depend on judges’ decisions. However, subjective evaluations raise risks of favouritism and 
distortions. Sport contests are a fruitful field for testing empirically theories of incentives. 
In this paper the behaviour of the referees in the Italian soccer (football) league (“Serie 
A”) is analyzed. Using data on injury (or extra) time subjectively assigned by the referee at 
the end of the match and controlling for factors which may influence it (players 
substitutions, yellow and red cards, penalty kicks, etc.), we show that referees are biased in 
favour of home team, in that injury time is significantly greater if home teams are losing. 
The refereeing bias increases greatly when there is no running track in the stadium and the 
crowd is close to the pitch. Following the 2006 “Serie A” scandal we test whether 
favouritism emerges towards teams suspected of connections with referees finding that 
these teams obtain favourable decisions. Social pressure by the crowd attending the match 
however appears to be the main cause of favouritism. 
 
JEL Classification: M50; L83; Z13. 
Keywords: Favouritism, Subjective evaluation; Sport economics. 
 
1. Introduction 
Many incentive mechanisms are based on subjective evaluations since it is often difficult to find 
verifiable objective measures of performance (Prendergast, 1999). Often these evaluations are 
made by supervisors, placed between the principal and the agent, who are delegated by the 
principal to observe and evaluate agent performances and are not residual claimants of output. 
Incentive theories have emphasized that subjective evaluations are plagued by a host of 
problems, from influence costs and rent-seeking to collusion and corruption, from compression 
of ratings to favouritism (Milgrom, 1988; Tirole, 1992; Prendergast and Topel, 1996). Such 
problems may be caused by exchange of money or favours between the agent and the supervisor 
(side-payments) to obtain a better evaluation or may be related to psychological and social 
considerations (Akerlof, 1980; Becker and Murphy, 2000). In fact, the social environment 
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created inside an organization by daily personal relationships between agents and supervisors 
influences judgments and, at the same time, evaluations might be based on a supervisor’s 
personal preferences. 
Contractual enforcement realized by a Court may be subject to the same problems, 
because it often depends on a judge’s subjective evaluation. As pointed out by Tirole (1999, p. 
761) “contracts are enforced by human beings. Judges are subject to both moral hazard and 
adverse selection; they may also have their own preferences […] Judges and arbitrators may 
also collude with the parties”.1 
In the light of the great relevance of judges’ and supervisors’ subjective evaluations, it 
would be useful to understand empirically to what extent economic or social factors can 
influence evaluators’ behaviour in real-world contracts. However, in normal business contracts 
it is hard to assess judges’ decisions or to obtain data on supervisor misconduct and empirical 
evidence on these aspects is scant.2 Data from sport contests can be very useful in this respect. 
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the working of subjective 
evaluation systems using data on the behaviour of referees of professional soccer (football) 
matches. Referees act as agents of the Soccer League (the national or international Association 
of Teams) to impartially control and enforce the rules of the game. Their behaviour may be 
observed and some aspects of their decisions can be measured. 
Economists are increasingly interested in the analysis of sport contests. The great 
availability of data on individual and team performances makes sport contests a fertile terrain 
for testing theories of incentives, labour markets and game theory (for a review of the 
economics of sports, see Szymanski, 2003a, 2003b). A number of papers have pursued this 
strategy. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) test predictions of tournament theory using data  from 
European and American golf tournaments, finding that higher prizes elicit better player 
performances. Duggan and Levitt (2002) study corruption by analyzing the performances of 
Japanese professional sumo wrestlers and find evidence that decisive matches are rigged and 
wrestlers exchange favours with each other. Chiappori, Levitt and Groceclose (2002) and 
Walker and Wooders (2001) analyze players’ behaviours in using mixed strategies, respectively, 
in kicking penalties in soccer and in serving in tennis matches. 
We empirically test whether soccer referees take decisions impartially (as they are 
delegated to do) or if they are subject to favouritism, because of social pressure, corruption or 
other forms of influence. We have detailed data for each match from two recent seasons of the 
Italian professional soccer league “Serie A”: 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. We analyse in 
particular refereeing decisions regarding injury time (or extra time) to be added at the end of a 
match. In principle, this time should be given to compensate for time lost for player injuries, 
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player substitutions, yellow and red cards, protests, and other wastes of time. 
The existence of a problem with the injury time decision is confirmed by the ruling by 
FIFA (“Fédération Internationale de Football Association”) which, in 1998, in order to limit 
referees’ discretion, established that referees have to announce publicly at the end of normal 
time the minutes of extra time to be played. 
The suspicion exists that referees are not impartial between home and visiting teams or in 
games between “big” and “small” teams.  
Favouritism towards a home team is due probably to social pressure from the crowd in 
the stadium noisily supporting the home team.3 Referees are human beings who – as shown by a 
series of psychological studies (see, amongst others, Nevill, Balmer and Williams, 1999 and 
2002) – can be subconsciously influenced by the noise of a large crowd in the stadium who 
react to adverse decisions by yelling and ferociously protesting.  
In addition to home bias, referees have been often accused of favouring “big” teams, who 
have economic, political and media power off the field. As a partial confirmation of these 
suspicions, in May 2006 an enormous scandal exploded involving some of the top teams in 
“Serie A” (Juventus, Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio, Reggina) which were accused of trying to 
appoint favourable referees for their matches and  put pressure on them.  
Our simple identification strategy is based on the assumption that, once controlled for a 
set of observable factors, the amount of extra time should be independent of the identity of the 
team who is winning the match at the end of normal time. 
Therefore, we first insert a dummy variable (Home Behind) equal to one if the home team 
is behind by one goal and equal to zero if the home team is ahead by one goal or if the teams are 
drawing. We focus on close matches because – given the low probability of scoring a goal in the 
few minutes of injury time – only the final result of these matches could possibly be changed. 
We find that the coefficient of the dummy variable Home Behind – in many different 
specifications – is positive and significantly different from zero, implying that the time added by 
the referee is greater if the home team is behind, giving the latter a greater chance of equalizing. 
Results show the great importance of physical proximity of a crowd to the pitch in influencing 
the referee, since the bias is much higher when there is no running track in the stadium.  
A similar analysis is carried out for the teams suspected of connections with referees, 
including in the regressions a dummy Suspected Behind indicating when a suspected team is 
losing. We find that these teams tend to obtain favourable decisions, in that, when one of these 
teams is behind, extra time is significantly longer.  
In both situations, we conclude that referees do not behave impartially, favouring both 
home teams and “big” teams. 
Our analysis replicates for Italy – one of the major European soccer championships – the 
                                                     
3 In soccer and other team sports, supporters usually attach themselves to local teams. 
 4 
analysis of Garicano, Palacios-Huerta and Prendergast (2005) who study soccer referee 
performance in the Spanish “Primera Liga” and Sutter and Kocher (2004) and Dohmen (2005) 
who conduct a similar analysis for the German “Bundesliga”. All these works find evidence of 
favouritism towards home teams.  
Our paper confirms their findings with regards to Italy, and extends the analysis to 
provide evidence that “big” teams and, in particular, the suspected teams in the 2006 scandal – 
who allegedly had established connections with referees – are favoured. 
We consider this kind of biased decisions to be only the “tip of the iceberg” of 
favouritism. There are, of course, other discretionary decisions taken by the referee during a 
match which could influence the result in a much more definite way: decisions on penalties and 
free-kicks, red cards, off-sides and so on. However, the merit of these decisions cannot be 
judged objectively and it is necessary to have a subjective evaluation of the phase of the game 
and of player behaviour. Moreover, when an evaluation is made on TV it is often different from 
that of the referee, which is immediate and without the support of technological devices. Even 
when decisions appear numerically to be in favour of a particular team, this might be the result, 
for example, of the fact that that team takes the attacks more often than the opposition, leading 
to a higher probability of winning a penalty or a free-kick, inducing the opponents to commit 
fouls. 
Besides being useful for verifying economic theory, sport is interesting in its own respect. 
Soccer is an important and growing industry in Italy and other European countries. According to 
Baroncelli and Lago (2006), the total revenues generated by soccer in Italy are 4.2 billion euro; 
moreover, about 25 million Italians follow soccer on television and 8 million watch matches at 
stadiums. Hot debates on television and newspapers, as well as between opposing supporters, 
are triggered by crucial referee decisions. 
One of the most interesting product characteristics that soccer teams sell is suspense, that 
is, the interest of spectators (and, as a consequence, attendance at matches and willingness to 
pay for TV coverage) is not only a function of the ability and effort of players but is directly 
related to the uncertainty of outcome (Neale, 1964). It follows that the aspect we examine is 
crucial for the economic health of soccer, because if referees are not impartial, suspense is 
undermined and demand might suffer. 
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2 we describe the data and 
provide preliminary evidence. In Section 3 we conduct an econometric analysis to estimate 
whether referee favouritism exists towards a home team and provide some robustness checks. In 
Section 4 we aim to evaluate whether “big” teams are favoured. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data and First Evidence on Referee Bias 
Data for the 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 seasons of the Italian soccer league “Serie A” were 
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collected from the website of RAI Sport (http://www.raisport.rai.it/).4 
The Italian “Serie A” had 18 teams in 2003-2004 and 20 teams in 2004-2005. In each 
season, teams played each other twice (both as the home and visiting team). Therefore, there 
were 306 and 380 matches respectively, totalling 686 observations. For each match (which is 
divided into two periods of 45 minutes), there are data available on teams, goals scored, injury 
time added at the end of each half, penalties, player substitutions, disciplinary sanctions (yellow 
and red cards), serious injuries, and attendance5. We have the time at which each episode 
occurred in the game (except yellow cards) and thus we can impute each incident to the first and 
second half or to injury time. Score difference is equal to Goals Home minus Goals Visitor 
(both measured after 90 minutes). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean SD Min. Max. Obs. 
Goals Home♣ 1.423 1.229 0 6 686 
Goals Visitor♣ 1.058 1.019 0 6 686 
Score Difference♣ 0.364 1.481 -4 6 686 
Injury Time Second Half (minutes) 3.625 1.113 0 8 686 
Injury Time First Half (minutes) 1.590 1.034 0 8 686 
Player Substitutions (Second Half) 4.564 0.991 1 6 686 
Player Substitutions (First Half) 0.275 0.539 0 3 686 
Red Cards (Second Half) 0.287 0.595 0 6 686 
Red Cards (First Half) 0.058 0.247 0 2 686 
Yellow Cards 3.933 1.865 0 9 686 
Penalties (Second Half) 0.169 0.408 0 2 686 
Penalties (First Half) 0.114 0.344 0 2 686 
Goals Home (First Half) 0.627 0.755 0 3 686 
Goals Visitor (First Half) 0.456 0.642 0 3 686 
Attendance (1000s) 25.860 17.137 3.8 81 681 
Track 0.475 0.499 0 0 686 
♣: Measured at the end of normal  time in the second half. Goals scored after 46 minutes are counted 
as being in injury time. 74 goals were scored in injury time. 
 
Injury time ranges between 0 and 8 minutes. Average injury time is 3.62 minutes. A total 
of 74 goals were scored in injury time (34 in the 2003-2004 season and 40 in the 2004-2005). 
Figure 1 is a first preliminary evidence of referee favouritism towards the home team. It 
shows injury time as a function of the score difference between the home and visiting teams 
after 90 minutes. In the situations in which the score is close – and hence extra time might be 
used by the teams to influence the final score of the match – there is clear evidence that referees 
tend to award significantly more time when the home team is behind by one goal (4.19 minutes, 
about half a minute more than average). On the other hand, there is a tendency for referees to 
reduce injury time when the score is not close, independently of which team is leading the game 
(in our sample 9 percent of matches involved a difference of 3 or more goals). 
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Figure 1. Injury time (in the second half) as a function of score difference in favour of the home team (at 
the end of normal time). 
 
 
Another kind of refereeing favouritism towards a home team that one might expect to see 
is the shortening of the match when the home team is ahead. As can be seen in Figure 1, this 
form of favouritism does not emerge in our sample. This is similar to the findings of Sutter and 
Kocher (2004) and Dohmen (2005) for Germany but it is in contrast to Garicano et al. (2005) 
who find that Spanish referees also favour home teams when they are ahead. A possible 
explanation could be that referees get less pressure because the risk of the visiting team’s 
scoring is significantly lower than the possibility of the home team’s scoring (see Table 1). 
Moreover, referee behaviour might reflect the preferences of the home team’s supporters who 
might be more averse to the risk of a defeat at home than to the risk of not winning the match. 
 
3. An Econometric Analysis of Referee Favouritism toward Home 
Teams 
Since extra time is influenced by a series of observable (and unobservable) factors, in this and in 
the next Section, we proceed with an econometric analysis in order to control for these factors, 
focusing on close score margins (485 matches) and ignoring matches with two or more goals 
difference in score. We do not consider these matches because, given the low probability of 
scoring per minute, only in close matches can a goal in extra time have an impact on the final 
score. 
We define a dummy variable “Home Behind” equal to one if, at the end of normal time in 
the second half, the home team is behind by one goal (N=111) and equal to zero if the home 
team is ahead of one goal (N=153) or if the game is a draw (N=221).  
Our main point is that if referees act impartially this dummy should have no role in 
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explaining extra time added at the end of a match and should be statistically insignificant.  
In column (1) of Table 2, a simple OLS regression is run with Injury Time as a dependent 
variable on a constant and our variable of interest Home Behind, with no other right-hand-side 
variables. The results show that if a home team is behind by 1 goal, referees tend to add 0.564 
minutes to the game (extra time is therefore 15% percent longer than the average of 3.652 
minutes), allowing the home team more time to equalize. The coefficient is statistically strongly 
different from zero (t-ratio is 4.91; p-value=0.00).6 In this and all other specifications, standard 
errors (reported in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
                                                     
6 Considering all the observations (686) instead of just the close games, and defining Home Behind as 
equal to zero except when the home team is behind by 1 goal, the coefficient would be 0.69 with a t-
ratio=6.26. 
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Table 2. OLS regression estimates for injury time. Dependent variable Injury Time. 
Explanatory 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Constant 3.652*** 
(0.050) 
2.085*** 
(0.238) 
2.238*** 
(0.245) 
2.306*** 
(0.313) 
2.263*** 
(0.295) 
 
2.069*** 
(0.239) 
 
Home Behind 0.564*** 
(0.115) 
0.485*** 
(0.111) 
0.509*** 
(0.108) 
0.522*** 
(0.105) 
0.489*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.745*** 
(0.166) 
 
Player 
Substitutions a  
0.280*** 
(0.043) 
0.261*** 
(0.041) 
0.262*** 
(0.043) 
0.283*** 
(0.050) 
 
0.274*** 
(0.043) 
 
Red Cards a 
 
0.135** 
(0.064) 
0.138** 
(0.063) 
0.163** 
(0.072) 
0.113* 
(0.064) 
 
0.136** 
(0.062) 
 
Yellow Cards 
 
0.062** 
(0.027) 
0.071*** 
(0.027) 
0.067*** 
(0.024) 
0.040 
(0.032) 
 
0.062** 
(0.027) 
 
Penalties a 
 
0.094 
(0.112) 
0.067 
(0.116) 
0.036 
(0.125) 
0.147 
(0.143) 
 
0.087 
(0.111) 
 
Difference in 
ranks   
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
 
Attendance 
(1000s)   
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
 
 
Other Stoppages 
  
1.503*** 
(0.547) 
1.571*** 
(0.478) 
1.871** 
(0.806) 
 
 
Goals scored 
  
0.044 
(0.043) 
0.037 
(0.039) 
0.086 
(0.050) 
 
 
Season 2005 
dummy   
-0.310*** 
(0.086) 
-0.304*** 
(0.106) 
-0.269*** 
(0.108) 
 
 
Team Fixed 
effects    YES: homeb  
 
 
Interaction 
Attendance     
0.008 
(0.008) 
 
 
Budget 
difference     
 
-0.0005 
(0.0008) 
 
 
Interaction 
Budget     
0.0005 
(0.001) 
 
 
Track 
     
 
0.099 
(0.095) 
 
Track*Home 
Behind      
 
-0.535** 
(0.217) 
       
 
R2 0.054 0.155 0.209 0.235 0.221 
 
0.167 
 
Observations 485 485 481 481 332 
485 
Notes: The dependent variable is injury time added at the end of the second half (in minutes). Home Behind is coded one if 
the home team is behind by one goal, zero if it is ahead by one goal or in the case of a draw. Standard errors (corrected for 
heteroskedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, 
respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
a: Counted only for the second half. 
b: F test that all Team Fixed Effects 0=iµ : F(23, 447) =0.67; Prob > F = 0.8774 
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In column (2) of Table 2 a more complete model of determination of injury time is 
estimated. According to the rules of soccer7, referees can add – discretionarily – extra time for 
time lost for player substitutions, player injuries, and other wastes of time. Therefore, we insert 
as explanatory variables Player Substitutions, Penalties, Red Cards and Yellow Cards (these 
variables are counted only if the episodes take place in the second half, with the exception of 
Yellow Cards, for which timing is not available in the data). Disciplinary sanctions are often 
related to foul play which causes injuries to opponent players. Moreover, penalties and 
disciplinary sanctions usually give rise to protests among players which lead to waste of time. 
The estimates reported in column (2) confirm that player substitutions and red and yellow cards 
appear to increase extra time significantly (respectively by 0.280, 0.135 and 0.062 minutes), 
while Penalties are not significant. The percentage of variability explained increases 
substantially ( )155.02 =R . As regards to the dummy aimed at capturing favouritism towards the 
home team, the value of Home Behind is only slightly reduced (0.485) but its strong 
significance does not change (t-ratio=4.37; p-value=0.00) when controlling for these factors: the 
evidence thus shows that the greater time awarded by referees cannot be imputed to player 
substitutions or disciplinary sanctions. 
In model (3) we consider additional control variables which could influence injury time. 
A match of  great intensity (a hard-fought match) is likely to cause more player injuries and 
protests and, therefore, it should lead to more extra time being added by the referee. As a proxy 
for the intensity of the match we include the absolute difference between teams’ rankings (given 
by their position at the end of the season) and the attendance at the game. Moreover, in some 
cases, matches are interrupted for serious injuries to players or for disorders among the 
supporters: we consider a dummy variable (Other Stoppages) equal to one when these episodes 
occur and zero otherwise.8 Finally, another two control variables which we take into account are 
the number of goals scored and a year dummy.  
The variables included to gauge the intensity of the game do not seem very significant 
and neither is the number of goals scored. Other stoppages is significant and the season 2005 
dummy is also significant and negative. Our dummy of interest Home Behind remains 
substantially of the same size (0.509) and highly significant (t-ratio is 4.37). R-squared is 
increased to 0.209 when these controls are added. 
We next estimate a Least Square Dummy Variables model to verify whether home team 
fixed effects are present in explaining extra time. Results are reported in column (4). Team fixed 
effects are not significant implying that there are no substantial differences between teams in 
                                                     
7 See the link “Laws of the game” on the FIFA website: www.FIFA.com.  
8 Excluding these (few) observations from the data as outliers does not change our results. 
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extra time (more on this aspect below).9 The dummy Home Behind is always largely significant. 
In column (5) we test the existence of some interaction effects. First, we interact the 
dummy Home Behind with home team dummies to check whether there are differences in the 
extent of favouritism between teams: none of the interaction variables were individually 
statistically significant (results are not reported), implying that referees favour home teams in 
adding extra time more or less to the same extent. However, this result must be interpreted with 
caution, because the variability of many interaction dummies in the sample is very low. 
Further, we control for the teams budgets (revenues) as a proxy of the power of the 
clubs.10 We insert, as explanatory variables, both the difference in revenues between the home 
and visiting team and this variable interacted with the Home Behind dummy, to check if bigger 
teams obtain more favours.11  These two variables are not significant12.  
We also test, in column (5), whether the number of spectators influences the extent of 
favouritism. In principle, if referees are subject to social pressure, when the roaring crowd is 
larger their decisions  should be more distorted in favour of the home team. We define an 
interaction dummy “Interaction Attendance” equal to Home Behind*(Attendance-24.876), 
where 24.876 is the average attendance in the considered sample. 
According to our estimates, the coefficient is positive, that is, higher than average 
attendance increases referee favouritism towards the home team, but it is not statistically 
different from zero. Therefore, even if we find strong evidence that referees favour home teams, 
we do not find that referee behaviour is influenced by the sheer number of spectators. A 
reasonable explanation is that we cannot assume that a larger number of spectators necessarily 
support the home team. In fact, matches are usually attended by larger crowds when they are 
played by teams from nearby towns or when very popular teams are visitors. In these cases, 
both the home and visiting supporters are likely to be more numerous: local supporters are more 
interested in watching matches against major teams or historically rival teams and, at the same 
time, visiting supporters are more numerous if the geographic distance is not high or because 
popular teams tend to have supporters who come from all geographic areas. Therefore, since 
there is no clear indication with regards the composition of a crowd which attends a big match, 
it is difficult to infer how the number of spectators influences the referee. 
Finally, following Dohmen (2005) we consider whether the presence of a running track in 
the stadium influences the extent of favouritism. In stadiums in which there is no track the 
crowd is much closer to the field and is able to put more pressure on the referee. About half of 
                                                     
9 Moreover, we have tried to consider visiting team fixed effects (not reported) without appreciable 
modifications. 
10 Data on budgets are from Baroncelli and Lago (2006). 
11 Moreover, we also considered Home Budget and Visitor Budget separately and the interactions of these 
variables with Home Behind but the results (not reported) do not change significantly. 
12 This is probably due to the fact that not all big teams tend to obtain favours (see Section 4 for more 
details). 
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the stadiums of teams in “Serie A” have been built with a running track for athletic 
competitions. The dummy Track is coded equal to one if a track is present in the stadium and 
zero otherwise. Much more important is the interaction variable between the dummy Home 
Behind and the dummy Track. Estimates are presented in column (6). This interaction variable 
has a dramatic effect. It is negative (-0.535) and statistically significant (p-value=0.014). When 
the match is played in a stadium in which there is no track, the increase in injury time if the 
home team is behind is much higher (0.745) (about 45 seconds). Instead, when there is a track 
favouritism towards the home team is lower and equal to 0.21 (which is only marginally 
significantly different from zero, p-value=0.101). This constitutes strong evidence that 
psychological pressure in a particular environment leads to biased refereeing decisions. 
 
3.1. Alternative Measures of Favouritism 
In Table 3, in order to check the robustness of our results, we follow Garicano et al. (2005), in 
defining an alternative dummy variable to gauge a team’s need for injury time (Home Behind 
GPP) coded as one if the home team is behind by one goal, zero if it is ahead by one goal, that 
is, excluding drawn games. In columns (1), (2) and (3) we replicate estimations of, respectively, 
regressions (1), (2) and (6) of Table 2 by substituting Home Behind with this new variable. The 
coefficient of  “Home Behind GPP” results as nearly of the same size as our previous results 
(around 0.5 minutes) and it is again significantly different from zero. When no running track is 
present in the stadium referees add 0.67 minutes on average. 
 
Table 3. OLS regression estimates. Dependent variable Injury Time.  
Home Behind as defined by Garicano et al. (2005). 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Constant 3.712*** 
(0.070) 
2.659*** 
(0.299) 
2.709*** 
(0.301) 
 
Home Behind GPP 0.504*** 
(0.126) 
0.438*** 
(0.125) 
0.675*** 
(0.181) 
 
Player Substitutions a 
 
0.201*** 
(0.059) 
0.189*** 
(0.059) 
 
Red Cards a 
 
0.220** 
(0.099) 
0.229** 
(0.097) 
 
Yellow Cards 
 
0.020 
(0.031) 
0.019 
(0.031) 
 
Penalties a 
 
0.079 
(0.125) 
0.074 
(0.127) 
 
Track 
  
0.011 
(0.141) 
 
Track*Home Behind GPP 
  
-0.474** 
(0.241) 
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R2 0.062 0.131 0.153 
 
Observations 264 264 264 
Notes: The dependent variable is injury time added at the end of second half (in 
minutes). Home Behind GPP is defined one if the home team is behind by 1 goal, zero 
if it is ahead by 1 goal (that is, not considering drawn games). Standard errors 
(corrected for heteroskedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * 
indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level.  
a: Counted only for the second half. 
 
A further check of favouritism towards home team consists in verifying whether home 
teams are awarded penalties more often than visiting teams. Given that there is a high 
probability penalties will be transformed into goals with high probability, penalties have a much 
greater impact on the final outcome than the lengthening of injury time. 123 penalties were 
awarded to home teams and 75 penalties to visiting teams in the two seasons under 
consideration.  
Since we cannot consider that the probability of being awarded a penalty is the same for 
the home and visiting team, because the home team tends to attack more often, we take the ratio 
between penalties and goals scored. This proportion is equal to 0.135 for home teams and to 
0.101 for visiting teams. A t-test for the difference between two averages gives a t=1.71 and p-
value 0.046, leading us to reject the hypothesis that there is equal possibility that penalties will 
be awarded to the home and visiting teams in favour of the hypothesis that home teams obtain 
more penalties.13 
 
3.2. What Causes Favouritism towards Home Teams? 
The existence of favouritism is therefore strong and clear in the data. What is the reason for 
referees favouring home teams? The most likely factor appears to be the influence of the crowd 
in the stadium supporting the home team loudly: referees subconsciously succumb to this 
pressure, avoiding decisions which would disappoint the spectators in the stadium. This is 
strongly confirmed by the different impact that the crowd has in stadiums with and without a 
track. 
It has been widely shown by several psychological studies that social pressure by the 
crowd is one of the factors that induces a home advantage in team sports. In an experiment, 
Nevill, Balmer and Williams (2002) have compared professional referees decisions (taken 
watching a videotaped recording of a match) when they hear the reactions of the crowd with 
their behaviour when they watch the match in silence. They show that referees hearing the noise 
of the crowd were significantly more acquiescent to the home team and in line with the effective 
                                                     
13 Unfortunately we do not have available data on refused penalties in order to examine the relationship 
between awarded and refused penalties for home and visiting teams (as made in Sutter and Kocher, 
2004). 
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decisions taken by the referee on the field. As explained by Wallsten and Barton (1982) one of 
the reasons which leads referees to take biased decisions is that they have to make instantaneous 
decisions, and they tend to focus on the most salient cues, one of which may be the crowd noise. 
Moreover, they tend to avoid potential displeasure for the crowd. Carmichael and Thomas 
(2005, p. 266) report that indoor sports – in which there is great proximity between the crowd, 
players and referees – are usually characterized by greater home advantage than outdoor sports. 
Akerlof (1980), Bernheim (1994) and Becker and Murphy (2000) have shown how 
individual preferences can be influenced by social interactions, by the human need to be 
approved or to avoid displeasure for others, even if this can be costly to individuals. Prendergast 
and Topel (1996) present a model in which supervisors in organizations trade-off the satisfying 
of personal preferences towards subordinates with a wage penalty deriving from biased 
evaluations. Garicano et al. (2001) explicitly model the trade-off referees face between material 
incentives deriving from a high probability of being re-appointed, if impartial, and their desires 
to satisfy the crowd. 
3.3. Falsification checks 
In this Section we undertake some further robustness checks in order to verify previous results. 
If the idea of the paper is correct, referees would be less influenced by the pressure of the crowd 
in the stadium (or by some other factor) if their decisions were not so pivotal, and therefore in 
these contexts we should observe less favouritism.  
Two circumstances in which referees take decisions which are not crucial are when they 
add extra time at the end of the first half – in fact even if the home team is behind there are more 
than 45 minutes left to equalize in the second half – or when, at the end of regular time in the 
second half, the game is not close (that is, there is a difference of two or more goals). 
Firstly, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 we test whether there is favouritism in deciding 
injury time at the end of the first half, replicating the regressions (1) and (6) of Table 2. Even if 
the coefficient of Home Behind is positive, that is, referees tend to add extra time if the home 
team is behind by one goal, it is not significantly different from zero (p-value=0.30). In column 
(2) the usual explanatory variables (player substitutions, red and yellow cards, penalties) are 
added and they all result as being significant, but Home Behind is still not significant.  
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Table 4. OLS estimations for injury time in the first half and in  games which are not close.  
 
Dependent variable 
 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) 
Injury Time 
at the end of 
First Half 
(2) 
Injury Time 
at the end of 
First Half 
(3) 
Injury Time 
at the end of 
Second Half
(4) 
Injury Time 
at the end of 
Second Half 
 
Constant 1.555*** 
(0.048) 
1.169*** 
(0.110) 
3.647*** 
(0.045) 
1.964*** 
(0.218) 
 
Home Behind 0.109 
(0.100) 
0.030 
(0.137)   
 
Home Behind Two Goals 
  
0.027 
(0.152) 
-0.123 
(0.195) 
 
Player Substitutions a 
 
0.213*** 
(0.083)  
0.267*** 
(0.039) 
 
Red Cards a 
 
0.474** 
(0.226)  
0.154** 
(0.066) 
 
Yellow Cards 
 
0.057** 
(0.024)  
0.085*** 
(0.026) 
 
Penalties a 
 
0.304** 
(0.124)  
0.094 
(0.113) 
 
Track 
 
0.094 
(0.093)  
0.155 
(0.086) 
 
Track*Home Behind 
 
0.087 
(0.197)  
0.317 
(0.299) 
     
 
R2 0.002 0.062 0.000 0.119 
 
Observations 614 614 511 511 
Notes: In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is injury time added at the end of first half (in minutes). 
Home Behind Two Goals is coded one if the home team is behind by 2 goals, zero if it is ahead by 1 or 2 goals 
or in case of a draw. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that 
coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. a: in regressions (1) and 
(2) these variables refer to first half events, whereas in regressions (3) and (4) they refer to the second half. 
 
Secondly, we do not expect referees to show favouritism when the score is not close at 
the end of the second half. In order to test for this possibility, we consider matches with two 
goal differences and define a dummy variable (Home Behind Two Goals) equal to one if the 
home team is behind by two goals and zero if the home team is ahead by one or two goals or it 
is in a draw. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. In both regressions, 
there is almost no effect on the allowance of injury time due to the fact that the home team is 
behind by two goals. The coefficients are not significant at any conventional level. 
These further tests confirm that referees add more injury time only when it is crucial for 
home teams, implying that the aim is just to favour them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
4. Referee Favouritism towards “Big” Teams 
“Big” teams have been often accused of being favoured by referees.14 As a confirmation of 
these suspicions, in May 2006 five Italian football clubs from “Serie A” (Juventus (Turin), AC 
Milan, Lazio (Rome), Fiorentina (Florence) and Reggina (Reggio Calabria)) were involved in a 
major scandal regarding match fixing. Police investigations uncovered – through intercepted 
telephone conversations – a network of relations between team managers and officials 
responsible for the assigning of referees to matches. Allegedly, this network was aimed at 
guaranteeing the designation of compliant referees for certain matches15 and to put pressure on 
referees to favour these teams. 
Juventus and Milan are the “biggest” clubs in “Serie A”. They have won most of the 
championships (“scudetti”) and the most important European club competitions. They are 
related to big economic empires (Juventus to FIAT and the Agnelli family; Milan to Mediaset 
and Silvio Berlusconi). Fiorentina and Lazio are also important teams from Florence and Roma 
respectively.16,17 
Sporting tribunals found these teams guilty of misbehaviour and decided to strip Juventus 
of two titles (“scudetti”) won in 2004-05 and 2005-06 and to relegate it to the second division 
(and with 9 points deduction); the other teams began the 2006-007 season with several points 
deduction (Milan: -8; Fiorentina: -15; Lazio -3; Reggina -11).  
In this Section we test for the existence of favouritism towards these teams (and then 
towards other “big” teams) verifying whether referees are likely to be influenced by 
connections, by the economic power of the teams or by their vast popularity. Our aim is to test 
whether referees show favouritism towards major teams regardless whether they play at home 
or away. 
We conduct the same analysis as in Section 3 but, instead of the dummy “Home Behind”, 
we define a dummy variable “Suspected Behind” equal to one if a suspected team is behind by 
one goal and equal to zero otherwise.18 We consider all the close games played by all the teams 
in the first three columns. 
Column (1) in Table 5 shows the estimation results of a regression of Injury Time on 
Suspected Behind as the only right-hand-side variable. The coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at a 5 percent level (p-value=0.03) implying that when a suspected team 
is behind, referees add on average 0.38 minutes to injury time (this is substantially lower than 
                                                     
14 For an analysis of this aspect for the German Bundesliga see Sutter and Kocher (2002). 
15 According to the rule of  “Serie A”, referees should be randomly selected, once being allocated to 
certain groups to take into account referee abilities. 
16 Another two teams which – on the basis of past success, of the size of their support and budget – can be 
considered as “big” teams are Inter Milan and AS Roma. These two clubs were not involved in the 
scandal. 
17 On the other hand, Reggina is a “small” club from a Southern Italian town. 
18 We do not consider matches in which two suspected teams play one against the other. 
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the estimate of about 0.50 for home teams). 
Column (2) includes in this regression some other explanatory variables (player 
substitutions, disciplinary sanctions and penalties). These variables, similarly to regressions in 
Table 2, results significant.  Suspected Behind is again statistically significant (p-value=0.013). 
Therefore, our estimations show clear evidence of referee favouritism towards suspected teams. 
 
Table 5. Referee Favouritism towards suspected and other major teams. OLS regressions. 
Dependent variable: Injury Time (second half) 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Constant 3.752*** 
(0.048) 
2.045*** 
(0.237) 
2.041*** 
(0.239) 
3.75*** 
(0.086) 
2.195*** 
(0.436) 
2.668*** 
(0.416) 
 
Suspected Behind 0.380** 
(0.174) 
0.422** 
(0.169) 
0.381* 
(0.194) 
0.382** 
(0.189) 
0.398** 
(0.185)  
 
Player Substitutions a 
 
0.298*** 
(0.042) 
0.285*** 
(0.043)  
0.228*** 
(0.073) 
0.176*** 
(0.066) 
 
Red Cards a 
 
0.150** 
(0.063) 
0.137** 
(0.064)  
0.161* 
(0.083) 
0.115 
(0.092) 
 
Yellow Cards 
 
0.069** 
(0.027) 
0.061** 
(0.027)  
0.113** 
(0.047) 
0.082 
(0.052) 
 
Penalties a 
 
0.099 
(0.118) 
0.108 
(0.113)  
0.062 
(0.182) 
0.146 
(0.229) 
 
Home Behind 
   
0.472*** 
(0.117)    
  
(Home Behind)*(Suspected Behind) 
  
-0.179 
(0.351)    
 
Big Behind 
     
0.210 
(0.181) 
       
 
R2 0.010 0.128 0.161 0.022 0.131 0.064 
 
Observations 485 485 485 182 182 192 
Notes: Suspected Behind is coded one if a suspected team (Juventus, Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio and Reggina) is behind and zero 
otherwise. Big Behind is coded one if a big team (Juventus, Milan, Fiorentina, Lazio, Inter and Roma) is behind and zero otherwise. 
Columns (4), (5) and (6) only consider matches played by one of the teams involved. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level.  
a: Counted only for the second half. 
 
 
In column (3) of Table 5 we analyze jointly the effect of favouritism towards home teams 
and towards suspected teams. We include both the Home Behind and Suspected Behind 
dummies and an interaction variable (Home Behind)*(Suspected Behind). Results show that if a 
home team (but not from among the suspected teams) is behind, referees add 0.472 minutes (p-
value=0.000) to extra time. If a suspected team is behind (not at home) referees add 0.381 
minutes. Suspected Behind is in this case marginally significant at 5% (p-value=0.050). Finally, 
if a suspected team is behind while playing at home, referees add 0.673 minutes 
(0.472+0.381−0.179). However, the additional effect with respect to home team favouritism is 
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not statistically different from zero (the joint significance of Suspected Behind and (Home 
Behind)*(Suspected Behind) is rejected through a F-Fisher test (F=2.17; p-value=0.115). 
We conclude that even if suspected teams appear to receive favours, these favours seem  
much less strong when compared with home team bias. Psychological pressure by the crowd 
can be more influential on referees than connections.  
In column (4) and (5) we focus exclusively on close matches in which a suspected team 
plays (N=182). The results are substantially the same as column (1) and (2): suspected teams 
appear to be favoured by referees who add an extra time of around 0.40 minutes (p-
value=0.033) when they are behind.  
Finally, in order to test the robustness of our results, we checked whether – beyond 
suspected teams – big teams in general are favoured by referees. We consider as big teams other 
than four of the five suspected (excluding Reggina) also Inter (Milan) and AS Roma. Results 
are shown in column (6). The dummy Big Behind is positive but now it is not statistically 
significant (p-value=0.249). Economic or political power by these teams does not appear, per 
se, to influence referees. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have provided strong empirical evidence showing that soccer referees are not 
impartial between home and visiting teams. In fact, when home teams are behind in close 
games, we show that referees tend to add significantly more extra time (around half a minute), 
giving the home team more chances of equalizing. 
This additional injury time is not related to genuine waste of time because when we 
control for a set of variables which determine injury time (player substitutions, disciplinary 
sanctions, intensity of the game, other spurious wastes of time) this favouritism remains 
unchanged in size and statistically significant. We show that a decisive factor in determining 
favouritism is the absence of a running track which implies physical proximity of the crowd to 
the referee. 
In order to substantiate that this additional time is due to favouritism we conduct some 
falsification tests: we show that referees do not add more time when this is not crucial for the 
home team, that is, at the end of the first half or when the home team is behind by two goals. 
Our results also appear robust to the definition of the Home Behind dummy.  
In the second part of the paper, taking into account the recent Scandal in Serie A in which 
some big teams have been accused of trying to select favourable referees and to influence them, 
we test whether the teams suspected of connections have been favoured by referees: we find 
evidence that these teams have been helped by referees’ lengthening of injury time when they 
were behind. 
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However, when we consider jointly the effects of favouritism towards home teams and 
towards suspected teams, we deduce that favouritism towards “big” teams is much less 
pronounced than favouritism towards home teams is.  
We conclude that social pressure from the crowd in the stadium noisily supporting the 
home team (due to referees sub-consciously succumbing to pressure or to their desire to 
conform to the crowd) is the main cause for the biased behaviour of referees. 
It is likely that this form of favouritism has had only a limited impact on final results and 
on championship rankings. 74 goals have been scored in injury time. 42 goals were scored by 
home teams and 32 by visiting teams. On average, 0.108 goals (74/686) are scored in injury 
time in a game or 0.030 per minute (0.108/3.625). Since favouritism has lead to longer matches 
of about half a minute, on average  0.015 goals for each match can be imputed to the home bias 
referee. The expected number of matches altered are therefore 10.2. Attributing to the referee 
bias the goals scored after 3.62 minutes, we are able to identify 4 matches in our sample which 
could be considered as being altered because of refereeing bias in 2003-0419 season and 6 games 
in the 2004-05 season20. Some teams were effectively helped and others were penalized, but the 
final rankings would not have been significantly different without referee bias in deciding on 
the length of extra-time.  
However, even if the addition of extra time has probably had minor effects on final 
results, we consider the allowance of additional extra time as just a form of a more general 
favouritism towards home teams, albeit the only form measurable, to some extent, objectively. 
Other forms are more difficult to assess as confirmed by the fact that decisions on penalties, off-
sides, etc. often cause endless disputes between experts or supporters after the match, despite 
watching the episodes on TV, repeatedly, backward and forward and in slow motion. 
Our results on referee favouritism are qualitatively similar to those found by Garicano et 
al. (2005) and Sutter and Kocher (2004) and Dohmen (2005), respectively, for the Spanish 
“Primera Liga” and the German “Bundesliga”. However, even though there is rather strong 
evidence of favouritism towards home teams, Italian and German referees can be judged as 
being comparatively better than Spanish referees: Garicano et al. (2005) find that injury time 
added at the end of the match is about two minutes greater if the home team is behind. Results 
for Italian “Serie A” show that “only” half a minute is added by referees. A similar figure is 
found by Sutter and Kocher (2004) and Dohmen (2005) for German referees. Moreover, 
similarly to the latter authors we do not find evidence of referees also favouring home teams 
who are ahead by one goal by shortening the game, while, Garicano et al. (2005) on the other 
                                                     
19 Due to refereeing bias the points in the final ranking for the 2003-04 season were affected for the 
following teams as follows: Lazio: +2; Lecce +2; Milan +1; Perugia -1; Chievo -1; Bologna -2; 
Sampdoria -2. 
20 The points in the final ranking for the 2004-05 season were affected for the following teams as follows: 
Inter +2; Parma +2; Milan +4; Messina +1; Palermo +1; Lazio -1; Atalanta -1; Fiorentina -2; Lecce -1; 
Sampdoria -1; Reggina -1. 
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hand, also found this kind of favouritism in Spain. The considerable difference might be due to 
different financial incentives offered to referees in these championships. Italian and German 
referees have strong financial incentives to be impartial: they receive for each match a rather 
high fee (respectively 2250 and 3067) plus travel and accommodation expenses. Referees risk to 
lose these fees if they are judged partial and are not reappointed in following matches. Garicano 
et al. (2005) do not report of any financial incentives for Spanish referees. 
The results of referee favouritism provide evidence that subjective evaluations can be 
affected by external factors and that judges can be biased by social factors. A similar result has 
been found recently, in a different context, by Ichino, Polo and Rettore (2003). They look at 
whether judgments about firing litigations are based only on a employee’s misconduct and find 
instead that judges’ decisions tend to be significantly more favourable to employees in Italian 
regions where unemployment is higher and vice versa.  
This evidence shows that social pressure and psychological motivations are important 
factors which need to be taken into account when designing incentive contracts and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
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